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14. ABSTRACT The Roman Republic like the United States was a sole superpower in a complex geo-political environment. Rome conducted numerous wars in the effort to protect its strategic and vital interests. The Gallic War was one of those wars. During the campaign, Rome's premiere statesman-general Julius Caesar used the instruments of power to pacify Gaul. The purpose of this monograph is to examine Caesar's actions in the conduct of the war and determine lessons-learned. This paper contends that Julius Caesar's adept use of political, economic, and military power provides valuable lessons for the United States as the country prepares for future conflicts.				
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

TITLE:

Julius Caesar and the Gallic Campaign: A Roadmap to the Use of the Instruments of Power

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Executive Summary

Title: Julius Caesar and The Gallic Campaign: A Roadmap to the Use of the Instruments of Power.

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Thesis: This paper contends that Julius Caesar's adept use of political, economic, and military power provides valuable lessons for the United States as the country prepares for future conflicts.

Discussion: The United States, as the sole superpower, has entered a dynamic global geopolitical environment. By fighting two simultaneous wars, which are hybrid in character, the U.S. has recognized the limits to military power. Therefore, since 2005, the instruments of national power (Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic) have become vogue in U.S. foreign policy matters. This context is not new. Over two millennium ago, Rome—another lone superpower—faced similar conditions in Gaul.

During the conquest of Gaul, a Roman statesmen-general adeptly used the instruments of power to secure the Roman Republic's strategic and vital interests. Gaius Julius Caesar is arguably the most renowned Roman of all time; as a politician and general, he had no equal. His bold, insightful, and pragmatic actions in antiquity's Western Europe provide a blueprint for current U.S. leaders and policymakers.

This paper contends that Julius Caesar's use of the instruments of power (i.e., Political, Economic, and Military) in the conquest of Gaul is relevant in modern times. The analysis is divided into three major subsets: (1) the strategic context is set with respect to the Roman and Gallic political, economic, and military climate circa 58 BC, (2) through a campaign analysis, Caesar's decisions and actions in the conduct of the war is scrutinized for key lessons-learned, (3) conclusions and recommendations are provided that pertain to the U.S. application of Caesar's methods.

Conclusions: Three conclusions, linked to this thesis, were found to be of value. First, Caesar used diplomacy and politics to form key alliances that allowed him to defeat or neutralize a numerically superior force. Second, economic rewards and punishments are an effective means to influence the behavior of friend or foe. Last, military might is still the cornerstone of the instruments of national power, but its efficacy is reliant on well-trained and -equipped forces who act upon clearly defined goals.

In addition to the conclusions offered, three recommendations are delineated. First, resoluteness in foreign affairs is paramount; therefore, the U.S. must strengthen its credibility. Second, the U.S. must become pragmatic—leaving the ideologue behind. Last, the U.S. must use military force only when the situation dictates.

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

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Preface

The genesis for this thesis began in 2001, as I proceeded to Afghanistan for combat operations in the aftermath of September 11. While on-station off the coast of Pakistan, by chance, I read a book on Julius Caesar. His life's story enamored me. Caesar was man of action, audacious, intelligent, and charismatic. From that point, I read every book about the Roman Republic and Caesar that was available. (So far, my collection contains over 40 books.) It became a passion. Then, I noticed a common theme: the Roman Republic and the United States were similar in various ways. Both were superpowers that possessed a world-class military. Both were compelled to hegemony in a complex geo-political environment.

As time went on, I compared U.S. foreign policy to that of Rome. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan garnered the U.S.'s attention and showed the limitations of military power. Many people believe that neither war would conclude with an outcome that was favorable to the U.S. Personally, I disagreed with this notion, but I also realize that the U.S. would have to change its methods in military operations and foreign policy. After serving multiple combat tours in both Afghanistan and Iraq, I noticed that Rome's war with Gaul could provide a roadmap to securing the nation's strategic and vital interests. Therefore, when the opportunity arose, because of my selection to attend the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, I immediately knew what the subject of my thesis would be.

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First, I would like to personally thank Dr. Pauletta Otis, my civilian faculty advisor for her enduring support and sage advice. Next, I want to acknowledge

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Introduction

In 58 BC, a tribe's migration and Roman paranoia produced one of antiquity's most dynamic armed conflicts—The Gallic Wars. A simple preemptive response to an exodus, ended with the complete subjugation of 3,000,000 people in an area slightly larger than the United States. The Gallic War began when the migratory Helvetii sought passage near Roman lands. This incursion upset the balance of power that Roman diplomacy and military strength ensured. Nonetheless, the Gallic tribe proceeded without Republic approval. In Roman eyes, this transgression was a *casus belli* for war.¹

Like most hegemonic powers, Rome quickly reacted to any perceived threat against its security. War was a common event for both Rome and Gaul. In both societies, the most effective way for an aristocrat to achieve status and wealth was to be successful in war. A proconsul in Caesar's position was expected to campaign against national security threats, especially a barbaric one.

Julius Caesar was the premiere Roman patrician. An exceptionally gifted politician and general, he single-handedly orchestrated the demise of the Gallic civilization. Ancient attitudes differed from today's views; the Roman public held no qualms about Caesar's action against the foreign threat. His conquest of Gaul was marked by lightning tempo that overwhelmed the far more numerous Gauls before they had time to mobilize and unite. Therefore, by Roman standards, the war in Gaul, was justified and for the good of the Republic. The war was waged to protect Rome's allies, interest, and power.

War in Gaul was not limited solely to military means. In fact, the Roman system placed considerable emphasis on other elements of power such as political and economic. This paper contends that Julius Caesar's adept use of political, economic, and military power provides

valuable lessons for the United States as the country prepares for future conflicts. The paper begins with the background of the Gallic War, highlights the lessons learned from the War, and suggests implications for the United States' future conflicts.

Background

Caesar

To understand the Gallic Campaign, a brief insight into its chief architect is necessary. Gaius Julius Caesar was born in 100 BC into the Julii, one of Rome's greatest patrician families. His father, a junior magistrate, spent considerable time away from Rome; therefore, Caesar's mother raised him in a small abode located in *subura*—antiquity's version of a housing project. Here is where Rome's premiere patrician spent his formative years amid head count (poor Romans), prostitutes, actors, and mafioso. This upbringing, perhaps, gave Caesar insight into the commoner's plight, which he championed in later years.²

At sixteen, Julius Caesar's father died and he became head of the household. Also during 85 BC, Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Marius, who was Caesar's uncle, forced Rome into a civil war. On the losing side, Caesar was forced into hiding and lost his inheritance.³ Broke and wary of Rome, the patrician departed to Asia for military service. He earned the *civic corona* (civic crown), Rome's highest award for gallantry by saving a fellow legionnaire's life. This courageous act signified Gaius Julius Caesar as a person of action.⁴

In 80 BC, Caesar returned to Rome. Impoverished and ambitious, he turned to legal advocacy and continued on the *cursus honorum* (course of honors).⁵ To gain distinction, Julius prosecuted and successfully exiled several of Sulla's supporters. Shortly thereafter, Caesar departed for Rhodes to study and was captured by pirates. When told that his ransom was twenty

talents, Julius Caesar responded, “[O]bviously they did not know who he was; he would have offered fifty.”⁶ During the two months of captivity, Caesar remained confident, telling his captors that he would crucify them when he was released. True to his word, Caesar later gathered nearby forces, returned, and crucified the pirates.

After completion of his rhetorical studies in Rhodes, Caesar returned to Rome and joined the Senate. This legislative period was noted for its extreme polarization; after Sulla, two main senatorial parties rose to prominence. Caesar, a member of the *populares* (populist senators), was subject to pointed attacks from the *optimates* (conservative senators). Many patricians displayed visceral feelings towards Caesar because of his support for anti-patrician political reforms and viewed him as a traitor to his class.

Looking for a change of pace, Julius departed to Spain where he saw a statue of Alexander the Great in a town square and wept. Caesar was 33 years old; Alexander had conquered the “world” by that age. By contrast, Caesar was trapped as an administrator in a backwater province. This moment was significant in Caesar’s life because he became relentless in the pursuit for achievement. With an early release from his *praetorship*, he left Spain for Rome to stand for consul. In Rome, Caesar established political alliances with like-minded patricians.⁷ Caesar was elected consul and resumed his anti-aristocratic policies including restructuring of debtor laws and land distribution to veterans.⁸


Caesar’s policies were unpopular with patricians because the disruption in social and patronage system but he held sway over the people. The *Optimates* would have to settle for an end to his consulship and force Caesar to revert back to a private citizen in order to extract revenge. To avoid prosecution, Caesar pushed through legislation that granted him the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul for an unprecedented five-year term. This masterstroke kept him

immune from prosecution; thus, sparing him from the *Optimates*. Nonetheless, as luck would have it, Transalpine, Gaul's governor, died and Caesar grabbed another province to oversee.⁹

At the end of his consulship, Gaius Julius Caesar had reached the end of the *cursus honorum*—and still, he thirsted for *dignitas* and *virtus*.¹⁰ He was broke, lacked a credible military command, and was a political outcast to his social class. To serve as proconsul on a frontier province was an opportunity for money, power, and respect that no Roman governor could ignore.¹¹

Gaul (Political, Economic, Military)

Gaul, the name give to Western Europe during ancient times, was comprised of modern France, Netherlands, Belgium, and included lands along the southern boundary of the Swiss Alps and western shore of the Rhine River. The territory was vast with abundant resources and a large indigenous population. According to Julius Caesar, there were three distinct ethnic groups that inhabited Gaul: Celtae, Belgae, and Aquitani. Each of these races was further divided into individual tribes. The Celtae lived in central Gaul within close proximity to the Italian frontier. North along the English Channel, the Belgae coexisted with several Germanic tribes. Last, the Aquitani occupied the fertile lowlands between the Cevennes Mountains and the Bay of Biscay. Several rivers separated the tribes; Celts were divided from the Aquitani by the Garonne River and from the Belgae by the Marne and the Seine. The Romans, except in reference to the Germanic tribes, conveniently referred to all these inhabitants as simply, Gauls.¹² (see Fig. 1)



(Fig 1. Map of Gaul, http://www.bing.com/reference/semhtml/Roman_Republic)

Politically, Gaul was instable because of tribal cultural norms and an invariable need of resources. Tribes near Rome were regarded as more advanced because they were agrarians who lived in permanent settlements.¹³ In contrast, egalitarian tribes farther from Rome were considered as primitive and many allied themselves with Germanic tribes, which was a major point of contention for the Romans. In 109 BC, the Teutones and Cimbri (both Germanic tribes) destroyed two Roman armies and numerous southern Gallic tribes resulting in a deep paranoia of Germanic activity west of the Rhine.¹⁴

The Gallic tribes were stratified into a hierarchy of social classes. Tribal chieftains, *defacto* rulers were supported by a warrior class, governed the people. Men who were not fit for combat and women formed the peasant class. Moreover, each tribe was a semi-closed society

that interacted with neighbors only for limited trade and war. The more powerful tribes, who were the most secure and prosperous, protracted large influence over their neighbors. Extremely independent, Gallic tribes were also free-spirited. The concept of nationhood was abhorrent to Gauls because of their strong tribal and social norms. This isolationistic policy caused enduring internal and external conflict.¹⁵

Economically, the Gallic tribes varied based on location and the method they acquired subsistence. The Celtae and Aquitani possessed a rudimentary monetary system that was supported by trade. Located close to Rome, both tribes had access to Roman goods—especially wine.¹⁶ In contrast, the Belgae were exuberant consumers who constantly exhausted resources. The Belgae, also the quintessential egalitarians, travelled from region to region devouring crops and livestock. This economic instability was a constant catalyst for tribal wars amongst the Gallic tribes. In addition, Gallic chieftains squandered the tribes' wealth and prosperity in the quest for power and prestige. Wealthier tribal chiefs kept a large retinue of warriors, a costly endeavor that led to an even more tenuous patronage system. To meet the constant requirement for resources, chieftains preyed upon neighbors, culminating in a vicious cycle of consumption and violence. These were the economic conditions in Gaul during the late-republic.¹⁷

Militarily, the Gallic tribes were a formidable and capable combat entity. Warriors, particularly the more affluent ones, were expert cavalymen. They were so effective that Caesar hired them as bodyguards. Their character of war was based on individual combat; in particular, the pursuit of glory and prestige on the battlefield. A “Gallic army” is a misnomer because tribes aligned themselves into large war-bands composed of elite warriors. In battle, a loose confederation of tribes led by their respective chieftains conducted raids or full-scale war against others.¹⁸ The Gallic *modus operandi* for war was simple: warriors would assemble and charge

into their enemy in a seemingly disorganized, yet brutally effective manner. The outcome was either victory over their enemy or stubborn defiance until enslaved, or killed.¹⁹

Rome (Political, Economic, Military)

Late-republic Rome was a diverse civilization that struggled to grasp the burden of hegemony, along with governance of a large and diverse population. The political landscape—based on ancient cultural constructs, government, and foreign policy was considerably complex.

Like other ancient societies, Rome was divided into a distinct stratified class system. The patrician class, or aristocracy, included the richest Roman families who traced their lineage to the founders of Rome. The Equestrians—prominent merchant and business class—whose acumen kept the coffers of the Roman treasury full followed the aristocracy.²⁰ Non-patricians were categorized as plebs and constituted the Assembly of Peoples or Popular Assembly.²¹

The Roman political system was based on an unwritten constitution that entailed an intricate set of checks and balances that preserved Roman societal and cultural values. Furthermore, Rome was an oligarchical-republic; the Senate presided over the populous under the auspices of security and stability in domestic and foreign affairs. A typical Roman citizen possessed neither the land nor influence to participate in state matters, which was entrusted to the patricians.²²

Various historians claim the Roman Republic was a reluctant empire that accumulated a vast empire in self-defense. On the contrary, Romans were imperialistic opportunists who violently defended their interest. For that reason, Rome's perpetual need for buffer zones to secure its ever-expanding lands led to various preemptive actions against unruly neighbors,

which resulted in an immense empire. Once a threatening region was subdued, it was systematically exploited for resources and absorbed into Rome's economic system.²³

During Caesar's time, the Roman Republic enjoyed the known world's largest economy. Agriculture, trade, and a service industry fueled it through numerous economic expansions and contractions. Rome's financial system was further entwined with a surprisingly modern monetary and fiscal policy. In particular, Senators and the wealthiest Romans were exempt from taxes and this arrangement was a regular point of contention amongst the ordinary citizens. In addition, Roman provinces were often exploited by their respective Proconsul who transported the ill-gotten gains back to Rome. This behavior was culturally acceptable for the elites, and expected by the citizens of Rome. Essentially, the client-kingdoms and vanquished were the true burden-bearers for the Senate and People of Rome.²⁴

What made the Roman economy dominate was the immense distribution network that brought the goods and services to all. This feat was attainable because of the roman-built *vias* (roads) that crossed the entirety of the Republic—from the Iberian Peninsula and beyond. Roman roads fostered trade and were used to collect taxes. In essence, these lines-of-communication and subsequent exchange of goods and services was ancient civilization's version of globalization. To provide security and equally important, the protection of economic interest the Senate and People of Rome depended on their renowned army.²⁵

In late-100 BC, the Roman army was the most revered and advanced combat force on the planet. As instruments of Rome's political and military power, the legions brought the lands surrounding the Middle Sea under Roman influence. To further understand the army's prowess, an analysis of its organization, leadership, and tactics follows.

The republic army went through multiple iterations. Gone was the land-owning militia, in its place stood a professional army; an all volunteer force comprised of the *capite censi* (head count), or poorest of Roman citizens.²⁶ With the Marian Reformation, the army became a permanent force in which the battle experience gained in campaigns would remain in the legions. Legionnaires were primarily heavy infantry and required the support of various domestic and foreign auxiliary troops. Those legionnaires not assigned to centuries served as cavalrymen or *farbi*; who were likened to engineers in a modern army. These skilled-artisans, known for their artillery and siege works, built some of the most remarkable edifices (e.g., roads, bridges, aqueducts). Besides the citizen legions, various *auxilia* (allied foreign troops) served as cavalry, archers, and slingers under their respective chieftains. In Gaul, Caesar relied on mercenary cavalry of Germanic and Gallic origin; they were known for their skill and considered the best. *Auxilia* were paid handsomely for their service and were given a chance for Roman citizenship.²⁷ (For more information on Roman Army see Appendix A)

Next, the Roman character of war was aggressive and depended on leadership for success on the battlefield. Culturally, Roman military leaders were expected to exhibit courage along with a near fanatical sense of duty and honor. The *centurionate* were career soldiers often chosen from the ranks based on years of service and merit. Strict disciplinarians and tenacious fighters, they were a valued asset in battle.²⁸ Military tribunes, the next step up in legionary hierarchy, served primarily as staff officers with the more distinguished and experienced ones designated as cohort commanders.²⁹

In addition to membership in the Senate, the *legati* were senior military commanders comparable to a modern Division Commander. As Roman historian T. Rice Holmes posits, “Their powers were not strictly defined, but varied according to circumstances and to the

confidence which they deserved. A legat[e] might be entrusted with the command of a legion or of an army corps...” To an extent, nearly all Roman officers received their assignments based on patronage including some centurions. The legion’s senior to mid-grade officers were drawn from the social elite and served relatively short periods in the army. However, those who possessed military talent often made a career of the legions.³⁰


Last, Roman commanders were victorious because of superior tactics based on sound logistics, weaponry, and discipline. “An army fights on its stomach,” an old army maxim, was sage advice for a Roman General. For example, according to renowned Roman historian Adrian Goldsworthy, “[Good commanders] could carry necessary supplies with them, maintain supply lines to depots established in the rear, or forage for provisions...”³¹ Caesar used all three of the above logistical methods. As the legions fought throughout Gaul, Caesar provided for them in an area approximately twice the size of Texas. (For more information on Roman weapons see Appendix A)

Galic Campaign (58 BC to 50 BC)

Catalyst (58 BC)

At the beginning of 58 BC, the Celtic tribe of the Helvetii and their allies (who totaled 368,000) departed lands east of modern Switzerland to migrate to western Gaul. They were under constant attack from Germanic tribes that raided their food supply. For three years, the Helvetii prepared, and upon departure took everything of value and burned the rest. Once in new lands, the Celtic tribe’s plan was to defeat the inhabitants and force them to move elsewhere. The migration route went through Transalpine Gaul—Caesar’s province.³²

The sheer number of Gauls on the move concerned the Romans and other Gallic tribes who detested instability in their lands. As proconsul, Caesar was troubled that other tribes might join the Helvetii, thus leaving a power vacuum that aggression-prone Germanic tribes could fill. Moreover, the Helvetii incursion provided Caesar the chance for *dignitas* and *virtus*, which he gained in the conquest of Gaul.³³ (see Fig. 2)



(Fig. 2, Caesar's Campaigns in Gaul, http://www.bing.com/reference/semhtml/Roman_Republic)

Invasion (58 BC)

The Helvetii ignored Caesar's warning and proceeded towards modern Geneva. With his available legions, Caesar raced through the Alps to catch the Gauls. He trailed the Gallic tribes waiting for an opportune moment to attack, which materialized during a river crossing. With

three-quarters of the Helvetii across the Saone River, Caesar ambushed the remaining fourth. The undeterred Gauls continued through modern Switzerland; soon, Caesar's remaining legions arrived with Titus Labienus, his trusted *legati*.³⁴ With resources dwindling because of a larger army, Caesar was forced to look for supplies in nearby towns. Now, the Helvetii pursued the Romans, pestering their rearguard. Caesar wanted a decisive battle; the Helvetii obliged, choosing to attack the smaller force of six legions. In a bitter contest, Boii and Tulingi tribes managed to flank the Roman left wing, which had deteriorated. Deploying several cohorts, Caesar countered the new threat and subsequently routed the remaining Helvetii. Victorious, the *Imperator* displayed *clemetia* (clemency), allowing the remaining 110,000 Gauls to return home.³⁵

After defeat of the Helvetii, the Romans moved against the Suebi tribe because they had migrated to Gallic lands. The Suebi and their king, Ariovistus, was one of the few Germanic tribes considered "Friend and Ally of Rome." Therefore, Caesar required a valid reason to attack. Ariovistus' tribe had attacked the Aedui, a long standing Gallic ally to Rome. In turn, the Aedui and other tribes asked for Rome's assistance. Caesar tried to reason with Ariovistus; nonetheless, negotiations between the two ended without resolution. Caesar knew war was unavoidable because Ariovistus would never voluntarily leave Gaul. Battle quickly ensued and the Legions were victorious over a second barbarian army in a year.

Accordingly, Roman key victories over larger Gallic tribes persuaded others to seek treaties. From the smaller Gallic tribes' point of view, it was better to be on the victorious side than dead or in chains.³⁶

Conquest (57 BC to 56 BC)

In 57 BC, not all tribes were convinced of Roman might. Some Belgic tribes were wary of Rome's intention and prepared to resist. They formed an alliance with their Germanic counterparts to fight against Roman conquest, and then marched south. On contact with the Legions, the Belgian-Germanic tribes became disheartened and disbanded after several towns were sacked by the Romans. This unpredicted withdrawal emboldened Caesar; perhaps, it was at this moment that he decided to conquer all of Gaul. He raised two more legions with the intent of proceeding north to face the Belgae and Germans.³⁷

The Nervii, the largest and most aggressive Belgian tribe, was infuriated because of Roman incursion into their lands. The Nervii were familiar with Roman tactics; consequently, they refused battle and instead looked to ambush the Legions. Caesar concluded that victory depended on logistics. Therefore, he quickened the pace forcing the Nervii to follow and extend their supply lines. Desperate and low on provisions, the Nervii attempted to ambush the Romans while they encamped. Caesar's legions, after two years of war, were fast to form a battle line. As the battle progressed, Rome's cavalry was bloodied by Gallic horse troops that caused the right flank to unravel. In a show of *virtus*, Caesar personally grabbed a shield and sword and fought at the front rank. Legionnaire resolve strengthened with the *Imperator* in the fray, the legionnaires avoided a near catastrophe.³⁸

As Caesar wintered in late 56 BC, several *quaestors* (supply officers) attempted to procure grain from the Veneti, a Celtic tribe but, unfortunately, were detained. This act compelled Caesar into a retaliatory expedition against the tribe. As the Veneti were a seafaring people, their settlements were on a peninsula flanked by the Bay of Biscay and the English Channel. The Veneti were egalitarians and lived in small hill forts and sustained themselves on livestock. Venetian ships were of high caliber; conversely, the Romans lacked a navy and had to

build one. When the Legions arrived by land, Venetian hill-forts quickly fell to them, forcing the tribe to flee in ships. On the water, however, the superior Venetian navy trumped the Romans in several engagements. Decimus Brutus was the *legati* responsible for Rome's newest fleet. Brutus developed new tactics that reinvigorated the Roman naval effort. He, thereafter, managed to defeat the Veneti by destroying their ships.³⁹

Publicity Stunts (55 BC to 54 BC)

In 55 BC to increase *dignitas* and keep Rome awash in his exploits, Caesar conducted several punitive and exploratory expeditions. The Usipi and Tencteri, both Germanic tribes, settled on the western shores of the Rhine in search of better lands. This displacement went against Roman policy: no Germans across the Rhine. With their trademark speed, legionnaires caught the unsuspecting tribes in camp and made quick work of them. Tens of thousands were killed; the bloodshed was so horrific that the *Optimates* threatened to prosecute Caesar for war crimes.⁴⁰

In a blatant publicity stunt, Caesar built a bridge across the Rhine to further punish Germanic tribes. This feat was for the benefit of Germania and Rome. The Germanic tribes would see the might of the Roman Republic, while Caesar's political enemies in Rome were reminded of his ability. Roman engineers built a large wooden bridge across the Rhine in ten days. Then, the legions crossed the bridge, burned villages along with crops, and destroyed the bridge on the march back.⁴¹

Besides Germania, Caesar's 55 BC and subsequent 54 BC forays into Briton were considered by most historians as exploratory and glory-seeking endeavors. On both occasions,

brief battles between the Romans and British tribes occurred with no clear winner. In *Commentaries*, Caesar noted his achievement on being the first Roman to invade Briton.⁴²

Northern Gaul (53 BC)

In 53 BC, the Romans finally decided to conclude the situation in northeastern Gaul near the Rhine Delta. First, Caesar recruited two more legions and borrowed one from Pompey. Next, he began the campaign season earlier than normal, taking the Senones by surprise. Then, Caesar moved into the Rhine Delta. This region contained marsh, along with various waterways, which Belgic tribes withdrew into when threatened. Caesar and his seven legions defeated the Senones and Menappi, more victims of Roman speed and expert engineering. Throughout the Delta, Roman legionnaires built causeways that allowed them to pursue the Belgic tribes, who were then defeated.⁴³

Meanwhile, Labienus battled with the Treveri, a Belgic tribe that lived between the Meuse and Rhine Rivers. Labienus used deception: he kept the army in column formation and pretended to head west. The Treveri, not knowing his plan, closely followed. After several miles, Labienus formed for battle and defeated the tribe.⁴⁴

For the second time, Caesar bridged the Rhine. This occasion was not a publicity stunt, however, but a punitive expedition against the Germans, who were providing reinforcements to the Gauls. After some initial success, the Romans withdrew to Gaul. Then, with two columns of three legions, Caesar and Labienus wrecked havoc on the Belgae for the remainder of the year. This ferocious onslaught destroyed the wealth and property of all the Belgae tribes, forcing them to surrender. In a year, northern Gaul was secure. Soon, events would turn for the worst, pushing Caesar and his legions to the limits of their ability.⁴⁵

Uprising in Central Gaul (52 BC)

In spring of 52BC, a drought reduced the Gallic harvest. To make matters worse, Roman demands for supplies substantially decreased the food supply. Gallic tribes, both friend and foe, were livid with the Romans for the hardship they created. Caesar dispersed the legions throughout Gaul to lower the burden against the tribes, but these redeployments placed Caesar in a dilemma: satisfy allies or risk being spread too thin. With Caesar and most his troops in northern Gaul, the central Gallic tribes seized the opportunity to unite. Indeed, this union of tribes begat Caesar's most decisive moments—starting with an outcast Gallic prince.⁴⁶

Vercingetorix, a large and charismatic Gallic nobleman from Arvernia, built a coalition of tribes (totaling 70,000 people) around his leadership. He gathered his forces in Avaricum, a formidable fortress surrounded by marsh and micro-terrain. At first, Vercingetorix conducted hit-and-run attacks against Roman forage parties and logistic trains, but was forced to defend Avaricum from the Gauls who lived there. The belligerents prepared for siege; Roman *farbi* built siege towers, which allowed soldiers to surmount Avaricum's walls. Under inclement weather conditions, Gallic discipline failed. This lapse allowed legionnaires to roll towers into place, overcome the wall, and storm the city. Caesar's troops decimated the Gallic coalition and claimed that no prisoners were taken.⁴⁷

After Avaricum, Roman brutality took its toll on the Aedui. Elements of the allied tribe revolted, with allegiance divided between Vercingetorix and Caesar. In particular, Caesar's stalwart Aeduan cavalry abruptly mutinied against him. Caesar, in a demonstration of restraint, allowed the mutineers to return to their homes. However, the *Imperator* sent word to Aeduan

magistrates about their treachery, saying he had every right to execute the cavalrymen, but would not do so.⁴⁸

Despite Avaricum's disaster, Vercingetorix managed to keep the Gallic coalition together. In fact, many Gauls were more encouraged by tribal unity than discouraged by the carnage in Avaricum. Unbeknownst to Caesar—whose attention was occupied with the rescue of a besieged Roman force near Gergovia—the Gallic tribes joined Vercingetorix by the thousands. Labienus with four legions was dispatched to modern Paris to deal with the Parisii and Senones, which left Caesar in Gergovia with only six legions.⁴⁹

Gallic victories in Gergovia increased Vercingetorix's reputation. For example, a dallied legionary-assault, in which 47 centurion were killed, emboldened the Gallic Chieftain, who now sought decisive battle with Caesar in Alesia.⁵⁰ Near modern Dijon, Alesia was a major population center and mountain fortress located in central Gaul. Vercingetorix chose Alesia because of the large amount of supplies stored within that could provide substance for a long siege. The Gallic Army was organized into two forces: one as a relief force and the other as siege force. To start, Vercingetorix's plan was to fix the Roman Army with a siege against the fortress, until the relief force arrived. Then, the combined armies would crush the Roman juggernaut.⁵¹

As the situation developed, it became clear that the Alesian siege would require a major engineering effort. Roman *farbi*—once again built an intricate set of trench—works that encircled Vercingetorix's forces. Through his vast intelligence network, Caesar received reports of the Gallic relief army approaching and sent for Labienus. To prepare for the inbound Gallic forces, a second set of defense works were built oriented outward from Alesia. This rash action—Caesar, knowingly isolated himself—made it impossible for the legions to withdraw, if pressed.⁵²

When the Gallic relief force arrived, Caesar and his men fought in two directions. Vercingetorix, on cue, attempted to break out of Alesia and was surprised of the stiff resistance that prevented him from doing so. Coincidentally, Labienus finally arrived; immediately, he attacked the Gallic tribes who had pressed Caesar. The Gauls outside of Alesia were defeated; they had lost the will to fight. Vercingetorix, now cut off and low on supplies, assessed the situation and decided to surrender. Next, he was taken prisoner and later strangled at Caesar's triumph in Rome. The official battle for Gaul was over.⁵³

To seal Roman victory, Caesar finished off those tribes that refused to submit. Legions were dispersed throughout Gaul to provide security and stability. Roads were built to link Gallic towns, while Roman traders dispensed goods for the glory of Rome.

Analysis

Political: Human Terrain, Foreign Policy

Before Clausewitz penned *On War*, Julius Caesar understood war was an extension of politics. Although an adept general, Caesar—first and foremost—was a politician who sought a political solution over a military one. Like the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, Caesar wanted nothing more than to win a battle without a fight.⁵⁴ To lose a legion or two, in Gaul, would have been catastrophic for Rome because of its many world-wide commitments. Thus, Caesar's renowned casualty-aversion was based on the limited number of available legions. As a result, politics was an integral, and commonly used element of Rome's instruments of power. The *Imperator*, after a term as consul, was well prepared for the multifaceted Gallic political arena. Furthermore, Caesar's political acumen is best characterized by his comprehension of human terrain and sound foreign policy.

Roman, or more pointedly, Caesar's purview of Gallic human terrain was a database of information: political geography, tribal values system, and intertribal relationships. This apparatus gave the Romans a competitive edge over their opponents, helping the *Imperator* make accurate and practical decisions.

In his book, *De Bello Gallico* (Gallic War), Julius Caesar delineated that the Gallic tribes closer to Rome were more advanced than those further away. Political geography is not necessarily inclusive to just locality, but rather the centralization of authority and commerce, which Caesar understood. For that reason, a tribe's proximity to Rome was a reliable indicator of its behavior. Several southern and central Gallic tribes, albeit sporadic, shared a peaceful history with Rome. They exchanged iron, slaves, and other materials for Roman luxury goods. In fact, some of these tribes even modeled their governments after Rome in a either a Diet or Senate. Because a centralized authoritative entity existed, Rome's tendency was to engage in political dialogue with those tribes. In particular, Caesar, during the height of Vercingetorix's rebellion, still pursued a political resolution with the Gauls instead of outright hostilities. In addition, when a faction of the Aedui revolted, Caesar preserved the Roman-Aeduan alliance by granting amnesty. The tribe's leaders were grateful for Caesar's level-headedness, and subsequently eliminated the malcontents. Caesar's command of political geography deflated an explosive situation.⁵⁵

On the other hand, the Germanic tribes' location made them impervious to Caesar's promises of wealth. In particular, these distant-tribes did not acquire the taste for Roman goods or its culture because of little interaction with Rome prior to the Gallic War. As a result, the tribes remained decentralized and autonomous, making a political solution unfeasible. Non-military solutions in northern Gaul and along the Rhine proved difficult for the Romans because

the Belgae and Germani possessed no centers of wealth or government to coerce. These tribes compelled Caesar to forego negotiations and use military force.⁵⁶

The Gallic tribal values system ranged from individual beliefs, such as martial prowess, to group customs that epitomized freedom and independence. Gauls were passionate about their beliefs and customs which made them susceptible to Roman political maneuvering. In particular, the quest for revenge was a primeval motivator in Gallic culture. Tribes fought countless battles to avenge a perceived slight or gross grievance. To illustrate, Caesar used the Gallic penchant for revenge to punish the Eburones in central Gaul; they had previously killed the Legate Sabinus and his men. To accomplish this task, Caesar sent a message to neighboring Gallic tribes offering them a chance for plunder and revenge. The Eburones' harmful treatment of their neighbors produced bitter enemies. Furthermore, Caesar did not want to risk losing legionnaires prior to the upcoming campaign season. Many tribes answered Caesar's call and subsequently devastated the Eburones. In this situation, Caesar's political shrewdness prevented Roman casualties and destroyed a rival in the process.⁵⁷

Political shrewdness was not Caesar's only gift. To his benefit, Caesar also discovered that tribal relationships, although tightly linked, could be broken if properly targeted. For example, at the outset of the Belgic campaign in 57 BC, Caesar marched north towards the Meuse River, gathering intelligence. The Remi, a Belgic tribe, witnessed Rome's recent conquest of southern Gaul. Therefore, the attuned tribe devised an opportunity for political and economic gain. Although of the same race, the Remi distrusted their neighbors because of their Germanic origins. According to the Remi, years ago the Atrebates, Menapii, and other local tribes had crossed the Rhine, displaced the indigenous Belgae, and settled. This centuries-old conquest by the Germani remained a point of dissension within the Remi. Sensing discord in the

region, Caesar accepted Remian intelligence and logistical support in exchange for protection. Again, Caesar deftly obtained a political victory that enhanced his military capability.⁵⁸

Although Rome's government lacked a foreign affairs office, it did possess policies towards other non-Roman governments, no matter the degree of sophistication. Rome's foreign policy, managed by the Senate, focused on the security and stability of the republic's interest. Notwithstanding their hegemonic tendencies, Romans preferred to establish client-kingdoms in which local rulers were free to govern as they saw fit, as long as Roman taxes were paid, trade flourished, and security was not impeded. Caesar, like his predecessors, operated within the confines of Roman foreign relations – Roman exceptionalism, aggressive-realism, and “Just War” dogma—and used each of these attributes to further his progress in Gaul.⁵⁹

Roman exceptionalism, or “Romanization,” refers to Rome's ethnocentric view that Rome was omnipotent and just; therefore, barbarians should be grateful for the opportunity to be included into the Republic. Furthermore, Rome was resolute and eternal. An affront was always atoned, no matter how long it took. Although this foreign policy was high-handed and included a high degree of hubris, Caesar displayed these characteristics when not only dealing with Gaul, but also other tribes.⁶⁰

Years before Caesar's birth, the Cimbri and Teutones won major victories against the Romans. These Germani were eventually defeated, and later formed the Aduatuci tribe. Caesar knew of the Aduatuci's ancestry and decided to make an example of those who opposed Rome.⁶¹ In an exhibition of brutality, Caesar enslaved the tribe, which totaled 53,000. Caesar showcased to all of Gaul that he was resolute and a man of action. Furthermore—the fact that after 50 years—the Romans had not forgotten their defeat sent a strong political message: Rome was eternal.⁶²

Aggressive-realism, the second attribute Caesar displayed, personified the Roman Republic's foreign policy: security and stability. The Senate implored a proconsul to aggressively act upon interests of Rome, which superseded other peoples' interest. To accomplish this mandate, Caesar employed alliances and leadership engagements. Rome, despite its supremacy, desired alliances because of the advantages. Roman allies provided vital resources, such as troops, popular opinion, and supplies. Thus, Caesar gained actionable intelligence, prevented unwanted conflict, and lengthened Roman operational reach through coalitions.

The Romans held no illusions that the Gauls also moved towards their own interests. This realism relieved Caesar of petty restrictions, freeing him to engage with key leadership and tolerate the occasional betrayal of an ally. Moreover, it provided a freedom of action to coerce, bribe, or negotiate with the Gallic senate or chieftains. Gallic leadership stood at the epicenter of society; hence, a tribal leader's inclination had tremendous influence over the tribe. Caesar preferred the engaged of Gallic leaders to bring them into the political discourse without conflict.

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In 54 BC near Roman Illrycium, the Treveri, led by Indutiomarus, repudiated Roman rule. They refused to attend the Gallic diet called by Caesar or supply troops; furthermore, the tribe had active dialogue with the Germani—Rome's sworn enemy. These series of transgressions combined with the fact that the Treveri had previously lost to the Romans in 56BC, concerned the *Imperator*. Therefore, Caesar and four legions promptly marched into modern Croatia to restore order. Cingetorix, the Treveri opposition leader, denounced the Germani and pledged his fidelity to Rome when the legions arrived. Caesar demanded 300 hostages and replaced Indutiomarus with Cingetorix as the Treveri chieftain. By being preemptive, the Proconsul re-

forged alliances, removed a despot, and engaged key leadership, while holding no predisposition on the methodology or means needed to resolve the situation. To Caesar, the outcome is all that mattered: everyone must yield to him.⁶⁴

“Just War” is the final aspect of Caesar’s political expertise in Gaul. Caesar proclaimed that his intervention and subsequent conquest in Gaul was within Rome’s policy of “Just War”—Roman causal factors of war must seem more just than the enemy’s. Caesar denoted, “Allies must be protected and dangerous neighbors opposed.”⁶⁵ Ironically, he selectively protected allies based on his interest and fashioned his own distinct version of “Just War”.

At first, Roman involvement in Gaul was defensive; they wanted to prevent the Helvetii from disrupting their interests. Nevertheless, like many hegemonic entities, Roman actions became subjugated affairs. By 56 BC, Caesar made it apparent that he expected the Gallic tribes to submit. If done so, he enacted amnesty. Those chiefs and tribes that refused his ultimatums did so with the pretext of war. Therefore, Caesar’s actions went against the “Just War” policy that a war’s purpose was to atone for a wrong. This stipulation did not matter; he simply circumvented it. Caesar, quite disingenuously declared that he was in Gaul to free them from Germanic oppression. Furthermore, he strategically communicated it through tribal diets and official correspondence with the Senate in Rome with some success.⁶⁶

Caesar’s employment of “Just War” was shrouded in hypocrisy; however, it provided a reason to conquer Gaul. Moreover, it shielded him from *Optimates*’ prosecution and gained goodwill with various Gallic tribes, especially those that profited. Despite the *Optimates*’ efforts, the Roman public supported Caesar throughout his campaign.

Economic Carrots and Sticks: Reward and Punishment

In antiquity as in modern times, economics was a vital instrument of power. It was the underpinning for Rome's political and military control of the province. The Roman Republic, along with Gaul, relied on economics to flourish and conquer. The exchange of goods and services afforded Rome the prospect of new commercial ventures to enhance wealth. Likewise, economics was significant in Gallic culture. A town's material goods represented a chieftain's vitality and status. Therefore, economic exploitation against a tribe became an effective Roman tactic to coerce conformity. Caesar used economics as a pretense for rewards and punishments in Gaul.

Although primitive, the Gallic tribes understood the premise of wealth and economic stability. In fact aside revenge, wealth was a prime motive to war against a fellow tribe. Caesar's acute awareness that "greed corrupts" helped him manipulate Gallic tribes when he exercised trade rights, monetary gain, and land distribution to advance his aims in Gaul.

First, trade rights and access to goods pressured Gallic tribes to carry out Roman biddings. Possession of Roman goods was highly prized, especially for the chieftains. Wine and other luxury items increased stature, allowed gifts for followers, and facilitated maintaining a large warrior retinue. Therefore, at times Caesar paid Celtic tribes in wine, which they later sold with a considerable mark-up to their neighbors.⁶⁷

Second, monetary gains seduced Gallic tribes and even legionnaires to Caesar. In parts of Gaul, coinage possessed economic value. Money was paid to Gallic mercenaries and chieftains who rendered their loyalty and support. These same Gauls bought Roman goods, which increased positive economic activity in Gallic communities.

Caesar also was known for benevolence towards his army. By custom, a Roman general was entitled to the spoils of war (i.e., captured slaves and valuable artifacts). Caesar distributed a

large share of the booty amongst his army based on their valor in combat and rank. Most legionnaires were either head count—and literally, Gauls recruited into the army. Therefore, they were poor and received minimum pay from the Republic. During certain periods, he also doubled their pay, which was not done previously. This practice garnered the loyalty of his soldiers; moreover, the chance for monetary gain motivated them to fight harder.⁶⁸

The third attribute, land, was key to Caesar's economic rewards system. Land was (and possibly still is) the most basic form of economic substance; survival, security, and wealth depended on it. To grow crops, graze cattle, or build a home, a tribe required land. Like trade, land was worth fighting over, which also made it a tool of manipulation. Caesar often bestowed captured land to trustworthy allies.⁶⁹

Conversely, Caesar used economic punishment with wayward tribes as an alternative to martial force. Caesar smartly showed a degree of moderate temperament towards his defeated enemy. He knew that if Gaul was to be held, then he had to secure an allegiance with its leaders and not mistreat future supporters. Military recourse was not always the best course of action; instead, economics was a prudent option.

To distribute economic punishment, Caesar used three primary techniques: quartering troops, taxations and fines, and destruction of property. Julius Caesar wintered troops near a recently defeated tribes' town, as a method of punishment. Quartering troops placed psychological hardship on the tribes because it created a high state of anxiety as to Roman intentions. More importantly, Caesar drained tribes' resources by forcing them to sustain Roman troops, which had a two-fold effect. First, the luckless tribe could not sell its food stuff to other Gallic tribes for profit, thus denying them monetary gain. Second, without food and resources, a tribe could not go on the offensive, which was Caesar's desired outcome.⁷⁰

Taxation and fines, the second punishment, was a nefarious—and yet, effective way to economically punish tribes. The Roman tax system contained a hierarchy of benefactors: the treasury, the proconsul, and the tax collector. This ominous system resulted in an exuberantly high tax rate. Tax collection was outsourced to *publicani* (tax collectors), who could levy any taxes they wished, as long as they paid Rome. If a tribe *degetio* (surrender before battle), then Caesar imposed a favorable tax rate on the hapless tribe. The tribe, therefore, would recover faster from economic hardship. Conversely, Caesar was equally harsh imposing taxes and fines on tribes that betrayed or refused to submit to Caesar, making the tribe's recovery more difficult.⁷¹

In battle, Caesar purposely targeted family and property. His destruction of Gallic property was a common punishment that fabricated results. A tribe's ability to wage war became extremely difficult when economic means were demolished. Food, livestock, and other supplies were necessary in ancient wars, especially in Gaul with its large tribal populations. The lack of resources forced a tribe to forage, making them vulnerable to a wily opponent. Also, Gauls frequently brought their entire family along during a campaign, causing them to move slowly. Caesar understood that warriors had to protect their possessions and families. Consequently, the modest cohesion in the Gallic masses diminished when their property and families were threatened by the Legions.⁷² Economics, along with the other instruments of power, brought the Gauls to their demise. Caesar skillfully used economic activity to lessen or increase a Gallic tribe's capability. For his pragmatic allies, holdings and influence were increased. The Aedui and Remi became regional superpowers in addition to "Friend and Ally of Rome." Conversely, tribes akin to the Helvetii and Eburones declined in supremacy or worse, ceased to exist as a tribe.⁷³

Military: Strategic and Tactical

Rome's rule was imposed and maintained by force. Roman style of warfare was delineated by sheer cunning, aggressiveness, and, when coupled with socially acceptable cruelty, overwhelmed less organized opponents. Hence, the Legions of Rome were the most instrumental factor in the Roman's rise to supremacy.

Roman military power was unequivocally linked and supported by political and economic mechanisms; however, it was Caesar's strategic thinking and fighting acumen that subjugated Gaul. Militarily, the Gallic tribes were formidable. Yet, they lacked the strategic and tactical ability to defeat their smaller enemy. Simply put, the Gallic chieftains failed at the strategic and tactical levels of war while Caesar dominated at each echelon.


Strategic

According to *Warfighting* (MCDP-1), "Military strategy can be thought of as the art of winning the war and securing the peace."⁷⁴ This view characterized Roman military strategy on the European continent. Caesar established the overall goal, crafted a way to reach it, and audaciously applied the force to win and secure the peace. Although assisted by Gallic ineptitude, Caesar's military actions at the strategic level were superb. He managed to defeat a force that was reportedly eight times larger than his ten legions.

There were two strategic concepts that produced numerous Roman victories: succinct and flexible objectives and "divide and conquer" strategy. Strategic military goals are the bedrock for any successful campaign. Little doubt existed in the *Imperator's* mind as to the military outcome in Gaul: elimination of security threats and pacification of the Gallic tribes.

This succinct declaration of objectives facilitated Roman unified military action throughout the Gallic area of operation. As a strategist, Caesar knew the importance of concise objectives, and that any miscalculation could lead to disaster. Therefore, he was vigilant in devising the Gallic strategic end state—exhibiting firmness but flexibility in his approach. Specifically, Caesar initially adopted a defensive stance with the inevitable peace remaining at the forefront of his military actions. As the situation changed, and Caesar realized that Gaul would remain unstable, so did the strategic objective to an offensive orientation.⁷⁵

Caesar envisioned and applied the “Divide and Conquer” strategy in Gaul. Based on Caesar’s assessment, this strategy was characterized by the positioning of troops in strategic locations throughout Gaul. Once established, the Legions would conduct offensive operations. “Divide and Conquer” was predicated on keeping the Gallic tribes alienated from one another. If not, then the plan was unfeasible. For example, Caesar described Gaul as separate unique groups with competing interests, needs, and wants. By sowing dissention, he kept the tribes politically divided, which was their critical vulnerability. In order to keep them physically separated, Caesar retained a central position. This operational design granted Roman independent actions and a mobility advantage, ending in a series of stunning Gallic defeats.⁷⁶ (see Fig. 3)



(Fig. 3, Roman Supply Bases, <http://www.skidmore.edu>)

From 58 to 50 BC, the Roman army operated on central lines of communication by forming a strategic alliance with the Aedui and Remi. The Aedui tribe was strategically located on the Gallic-side of the Alps in southern Gaul, while the Remi were situated due north. These *oppidums* formed a procession of firm-bases from the Italian frontier to the English Channel separating the Aquitani, Belgae, and Germani tribes. By using the central position Caesar, prevented the unification of the Gallic tribes, which he individually maneuvered against defeating them one by one. More importantly, the Gauls' superior numbers were negated due to their inability to mass.⁷⁷

Tactical

As opposed to strategy, tactics is winning engagements and battles. That said, whenever the Romans fought a battle, they fought to win, pursuing total victory with a ruthlessness and relentlessness unparalleled in antiquity. By using asymmetric principles, Rome raised its combat power. Gallic and Roman fighting styles were opposite of each other—hard discipline versus indiscriminate chaos. In battle, the Legions' superior leadership, flexibility, and *modus operandi* gave them the advantage over the Gauls.⁷⁸ These three characteristics are discussed below.

The Roman army, cohort-level and below, benefited from an all-volunteer professional officer cadre. Centurions, considered the cornerstone of the legions, were heavily relied upon by Caesar. They were responsible for the discipline, training, and fighting esprit-de-corps in the army. In battle, the centurionate led each assault, displaying courage and tenacity. These grizzled *aguerri* (veterans) epitomized combat leadership from the front, possessing the dubious honor of the highest casualty rate amongst Roman soldiers. Even when besieged, centurions stabilized the situation, continuing to press for victory.

For example, while out foraging, a group of legionnaires were attacked by German cavalry. The troops tried to return to the legionary camp but, were harassed to the point of isolation. Sextius Baculus, a wounded senior centurion in the 14th Legion, arose from his sick bed to assist. He manned the gates holding off an enemy force that allowed the rest of the garrison to man fortifications; thus, saving the legionnaires.⁷⁹

Moreover, the Roman leadership system fostered initiative and authority down to the centurion-level, which allowed exploitation of enemy weaknesses. The Gauls did not have a centurion-equivalent and suffered for it due to the individualistic nature of the Gallic combat style. In particular, Gallic combat lacked order; so when hard-pressed, the tribes tended to flee. Then, when individual resolve faltered, there was little incentive for a tribesman to stay in the

fight. In current military terms, Gauls were one-dimensional fighters at the tactical level; they could not easily transition from defensive to offensive operations.

In contrast, the legions fought in three distinct warfare forms: open battle, siege, and guerilla warfare. This flexibility in warfare was a force-multiplier for Caesar.

In open battle, the legions used formations and maneuver to defeat the Gauls. The Romans deployed in three-line system or checkerboard-pattern with gaps that allowed troops to deploy in intervals. Thus, there was a continuous presence of fresh legionnaires funneling into the front rank. Gallic tribes soon became tired. Caesar's in-depth formations easily withstood the fierce Gallic charge and were flexible enough to outmaneuver any flanking movement.⁸⁰

Many Roman battles in Gaul involved siege operations. When the Gallic army could not be forced into a decisive battle, Caesar laid siege to neighboring towns. This action weakened the prestige of the Gallic chieftain, forcing them to risk battle, or lose the town. A typical Roman siege progressed as follows. First, Rome's superior engineering reduced the defenses of a fortress. The Legions, then, through starvation, stealth, or frontal attack captured the Gallic stronghold. The Battle of Avaricum and Alesia are cases of successful Roman sieges.⁸¹

Guerilla warfare was common, especially in northeast and southwest portions of Gaul. Unable or afraid to mass against Caesar's troops, Gallic tribes used hit-and-run tactics. To counter these guerrilla bands, Rome tailor-made small units that included a mixture of cavalry, light troops, and legionnaires. *Vastatio* (devastation) was the military objective in this situation. Roman cohorts targeted enemy villages, burning crops, and seizing livestock. The area affected was comparatively small, but the terror spread had a lasting effect on Gallic communities. Caesar's troops through their training and discipline seamlessly transition between these forms of combat. This flexibility paralyzed the Gauls, who lost the initiative to Roman asymmetry.⁸²

To meet the operational design of the ‘Divide and Conquer’ strategy, Caesar’s *modus operandi* was distributed operations. A form of maneuver warfare—distributed operations created a spatial advantage over the enemy that was gained through the deliberate use of separation and interdependent combat actions. Often, the legions would spread across Gaul to interdict supplies and prevent enemy access to key avenues of approach. Still, they retained the ability to converge when required. This technique further prohibited the Gauls from uniting. By operating in this disaggregated fashion, Caesar also attacked along multiple axes against enemy critical vulnerabilities. The Romans preferred the decisive battle. With distributed operations, they re-aggregated to exploit a developing situation or defeat a vulnerable opponent.⁸³

In 56 BC, the Roman army was distributed throughout central and eastern Gaul. Abriorix, a Belgic chieftain, nearly wiped out Lucius Cotta and his legion, with a force of 60,000 Belgae. Shortly thereafter, they proceeded to move against Quintus Tullius Cicero, stationed nearby. The *Imperator*, in upper Gaul, turned back to the relief of Cicero. The besiegers, however, received word of Caesar’s approach and pursued. The Romans denied them battle until a place to fortify a camp was located. Using restraint, Caesar withheld his troops, waiting for the right moment to attack. This ploy enraged the Gauls who then foolishly assailed the Legions. Now, Caesar led his men out and routed Abriorix, along with his tribesmen. Although the Gauls won an engagement, they lost the decisive battle with nearly 60,000 killed. Distributed operations solidified Caesar’s victories in Gaul.⁸⁴

Caesar had made mistakes in his early campaigns, but quickly recovered over time with his charm, practicality, and competence. The mistakes and failures; i.e., haphazard nature of the British Expeditions, the loss of Cotta and Sabinus’ legionnaires and the glory-seeking defeat in Gergovia—that said, there was no doubt in Caesar’s mind that he would succeed in the end.

Roman military operations remained focused due to a unified command structure and clarity of purpose. Unity of command was non-existent within the tribes until Vercingetorix's rebellion, and by then—it was too late. The fact that Caesar was the sole commander streamlined the Roman war effort. As a result, the Romans remained seemingly omnipotent⁸⁵

Judgments

Is the US, Rome? The answer is “no.” This thesis is not another screed that attempts to find bits of Roman history to justify American decline. Rome imploded due to the weight of hegemony and the refusal to further adapt to the times. Nonetheless, it lasted for nearly 1,000 years before the Vandals sacked the city.⁸⁶ In contrast, the U.S. is a very young nation that still adheres to its founding principles. However, like Rome in 50 BC, America is at a crossroads. Perhaps, a more appropriate question is—how does the U.S. remain relevant in the new world order?

Over the last decade, the U.S. has rediscovered the elements of national power. Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that military force—or, threat thereof—is not enough. With globalization and its effects, the world is evolving into a new and complex geopolitical environment. In order to remain a dominant actor on the world stage, then the U.S. will have to refine its diplomatic and military policies.

First, resoluteness in action is paramount. This adage entails a thorough apolitical analysis of the nation's strategic goals and vital interests; once complete, governmental leaders must be unswerving in the achievement of the task at hand. More often, the global community anxiously awaits a U.S. decision before they choose to act. Their subsequent behavior is based on the U.S. level of commitment, and therefore resolve. In the past, the U.S. has faltered in its

obligations; i.e. Vietnam, Somalia. This indecisiveness could potentially endanger national security. America's enemies have become embolden and its allies unresponsive due to the lack of U.S. willpower. To move forward, the U.S. should realize both political and military credibility matters. Rome understood this concept. In fact, credibility was a guiding principle in its diplomatic and military matters. Carthage, Gaul, and others are a testament to Roman credibility and resolve.

To further expound, the U.S. cannot afford future missteps with respect to resolve—which implies the use of military force. The American public will never forgive leaders that squander precious resources and lives. Therefore, prior to committing U.S. armed forces, a lucid and defined set of strategic goals should be delineated. And by this concept—do the ends justify the means? If so, then America must be resolute and prepared to use all available means to achieve success. Furthermore, the U.S. must be deliberate in decision-making, but bold in action. In adopting this premise, the world will realize: the U.S. says what it means and does what it says.

Second, the U.S. must become pragmatic—leaving the ideologue behind. Globalization has forever changed the nature and character of international relations. “Freedom, Justice, and the American Way” ideology was necessary during the Cold War and the immediate aftermath. The United States global battle with the Soviet Union, forced the world community to choose sides, which is no longer the case. New economic prosperity, a byproduct of globalization, has flourished into world-wide nationalism. Countries—now, more than ever—have found their identity and seek the world stage. Subsequently, they want to pursue their own interests with minimum U.S. interference. China, Brazil, and India are examples of emerging economic powers that possess global reach. The U.S. must acknowledge this paradigm shift and form a pragmatic diplomatic and economic approach to deal with it, while protecting interests.

The Honorable Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary of Defense, coined the phrase “Soft Power” during the initial years of his current tenure. This strategy focuses on the whole of government approach to foreign policy and national security. It is definitely a step in the right direction; however, the U.S. should proceed further. To this effect, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with American exceptionalism. American citizens should be proud of their country and its achievements. But perhaps, exceptionalism should remain within the borders. The entire global community knows of America and its supremacy, it has been bombarded through every clime and place for years. Unfortunately, exceptionalism now breathes arrogance, which has produced or empowered dangerous enemies. The U.S. lacks the money or military capacity to physically destroy every threat—actual or perceived. Simply put, power has its limitations.

In today’s environment, the power of attraction weighs heavily against coercion or exclusionism. Therefore, the U.S. ought to put aside exceptionalism and imbue the laws of attraction. A degree of pragmatism is needed here. And by that, the U.S. should view the world as it is, and not necessarily how America wishes it to be. Case in point, Caesar was culturally attuned to Gallic socio-political sensitivities. He understood that if Roman values and customs were forced upon the Gauls, then they would further resist. The tribes had to willfully want to become like Rome. Caesar, therefore, did not attempt to impose a different method of rule over the Gallic tribes, but worked within their system of government. The Romans helped with infrastructure and economic development, which introduced to the Gauls the benefits of Rome. By setting the example, Rome established a symbiotic relationship with the “barbarians”, who would emulate the Republic for the next 400 years.⁸⁷

Last, the planet is still a dangerous place. To wish away a threat is irresponsible—and, more so—perilous. The U.S. must be willing to use military force when the situation dictates; i.e.,

threats to national security and vital interests. Furthermore, Iraq and Afghanistan has provided a blueprint on how to fight the United States. Hence, conventional warfare with large mechanized divisions has now morphed into asymmetric warfare, characterized by its guerilla-style tactics and instruments of terror. This form of combat is dynamic, difficult to defend against, and quite effective when correctly applied. The U.S., therefore, must respond in kind.

Asymmetric warfare is not new. Two millennium ago in Gaul and elsewhere, the Romans fought numerous asymmetric wars with outstanding results. Like Caesar's Legions, it is imperative that U.S. forces operate in an agile, deadly, and disciplined fashion. This requirement constitutes a foundation in superior leadership and weapons. Military leaders trained as critical-thinkers and warriors will provide added-value to the armed services. As with asymmetric warfare in 55 BC, the U.S. military will rely on junior leaders to operate in a disaggregated and independent fashion. Just as important, the current technological advantage cannot be compromised. Fiscally responsible weapons-procurement that concentrates on the hybrid and spatial aspects of asymmetric warfare will ensure U.S. supremacy in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

In the course of eight years, a relatively small effective force that never numbered above 70,000 conquered a population of 3,000,000, killing over 1,000,000. Moreover, the Romans managed to control 200,000 square miles of territory and sack 800 *oppidums*. Whether justified or not, Caesar extended Roman rule to the Rhine in the east, the English Channel in the north and the Atlantic coast in the west. The area would remain so for the next five centuries. Roman rule brought to Gaul a number of advantages to include stability and prosperity. Arguably, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Gauls were better off under the Romans than they were before

and after it failed. Rome had a plethora of faults—slavery and summary executions are just a few. However, Caesar was not responsible for Roman imperialism or Roman culture. His Gallic conquest were not a burning desire or hatred, but segue of chance and opportunity that could not be ignored, which is common in most reluctant empires.⁸⁸

Successful imperial powers have always relied on political and economic settlements as well as military force. Yet, Caesar realized to pacify Gaul, a political and economic settlement was needed which was acceptable to the occupied peoples, and in particular those with power and influence. This principle was as true for men like Kitchener in South Africa or Petraeus in Iraq—as it was for Caesar in Gaul. All these men were gifted generals who had achieved victory on the battlefield, but each realized that this was not enough without effective diplomacy and competent administration. With some adaptation, Caesar's use of political, economic, and military power can serve as a framework for future asymmetric conflicts.⁸⁹

¹ Matthias Gelzer, *Caesar: Politician and Statesman*, Translated by Peter Needham, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 104-106.

² Freeman, 19.

³ In 83 to 81 BC, Roman dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla an ultra-conservative marched on Rome after a successful campaign in the east. The causal factors were due to riots in the city between Gaius Marius supporters and his. Rome was divided between the progressives who wanted reform and the conservative who wish to retain the status quo. It was a deadly revolt, ending with Sulla as the victor. Therefore, he proscribed or outlawed enemies of the state, as deemed by him. With proscription, the state confiscated all of a Roman's property and belongings in addition to placing a bounty on them. Those who were proscribed were usually killed on sight by an enterprising Roman who wished to gain favor with the Senate. Proscription was a good way to raise revenue when the treasury was low; it was enacted several times through Roman history. For more information, see Tom Holland, *The Rubicon: The Last Years of the Roman Republic*, (London: Little, Brown; New York: Random House, 2004), 82-102.

⁴ Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of A Colossus*, 65-66. For more information on proscription, see Note 25.

⁵ For information on cursus honorum, see Note 20.

⁶ Meir, 108.

⁷ Chad De Las Casas, "The Foreign Policy Similarities between Ancient Rome and Modern America", www.associatedcontent.com, accessed November 9, 2009, 1-3. The First Triumvirate between Julius Caesar, Pompey Magnus, and Marcus Crassus was a secret cabal that supplanted the Senate in 60 BC. The Senate had become too divisive, thus unable to act on republic matters of great importance. Therefore, Caesar along with his ilk used money, coercion, and public opinion govern the Roman Republic. Each of these members would alternate to stand for election as consul, guaranteeing that one of the three would always be in control of the Republic. For more information on the Triumvirate, see Holland, 220-249.

⁸ Ibid. 141. Upon return, Caesar resumed his long affiliation with the titillation-prone Roman public. He amassed enormous debt from sponsorship of gladiator games, parades, and other spectacles to garner public opinion and *existimatio* (clout). *Optimates* attacks increased with intensity; to counter a coalition was formed between Julius Caesar, Pompey Magnus, and Marcus Crassus. This alliance was called the Triumvirate: Caesar brought the public, Pompey brought the legions, and Crassus brought the financial support. For more information see, Freeman, 88-92.

⁹ Ibid., 221. Caesar was appointed proconsul (governor) of Illyricum and Transalpine Gaul for five years. However, the proconsul for Cisalpine Gaul died and Caesar was granted a third province to administer. During the course of the Gallic campaign, he was given an additional five years in his term.

¹⁰ Dignitas and virtus were quintessential Roman qualities that the aristocracy tried to emulate and display. Adrian Goldsworthy denotes, Dignitas is the sober bearing that displayed openly the importance and responsibility of a man and so commanded respect. Virtus had strong military overtones, embracing not simply bravery, but confidence, moral courage and the skills required by both soldier and commander. See Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 37.

¹¹ For more information on Caesar's life see Adrian Goldsworthy, *In the Name of Rome*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003), 183-185.

¹² Julius Caesar, *The Battle for Gaul*, Translated by Anne and Peter Wiseman, (Boston: David R Godine Publishing Inc, 1980), 10-13, 17.

¹³ Kate Gilliver, *Caesar's Gallic Wars*, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 74.

¹⁴ Plutarch, *Fall of the Roman Republic*, Translated by Rex Warner and Robin Seager, (London: Penguin Group, 1958, 2005), 13. Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar's Uncle, went on to defeat the Germanic tribes.

¹⁵ Christian Meir and translated by David McLintock, *Caesar: A Biography*, n.p., (Germany: Serverin and Siedler; London: HarperCollins, 1995), 237-239. Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul were two provinces acquired by Rome in 83 BC with the defeat of the indigenous Gallic tribes. These tribes, eventually, became "Romanized" and deemed "Friend and Ally of Rome."

¹⁶ Gilliver, 15. Wine was a key symbol of wealth and status within the Gallic tribes. At one point, a vase of wine was equal to one slave.

¹⁷ Phillip Freeman, *Julius Caesar*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 112-115. Also, late-republic refers to the time frame between 90 BC to 27 BC. It was plagued with numerous civil wars; eventually, transforming into the Roman Empire.

¹⁸ For the purpose of this thesis, the Gallic army will be described as such to avoid confusion. For more information on Gallic style of combat, see Gilliver, 19-29.

¹⁹ Information on Gallic warrior training, see Jane Penrose, *Rome and Her Enemies*, (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2008), 134, 138. Archers and slingers were not considered the warrior elites, but appropriately trained peasants who were pressed into service during wartime.

²⁰ Nigel Rogers, *Ancient Rome*, (London: Hermes House, 2006), 92. In early-Republic, the Equestrians were the original cavalrymen, hence the name, because they possessed the wealth to purchase and care for a horse,

²¹ Adrian Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 17. New Men were plebeians who were the first in their families to reach the Senate through the *cursus honorum* (see note 12).

²² In Caesar's time, the Senate totaled approximately 800 members. At the summit, sat the consuls; two senators elected to serve as the prime ministers of Rome. To gain admission to the Senate, ambitious nobles sought to become junior magistrates; administrators, judges, and military officers in service of the republic elected by the Assembly. The link between the Senate and People of Rome consisted of a strong patronage system. Patrons, who were Senators and Equestrians, supported clients with resources and political connections in a *quid pro quo* for votes on referendums and policy matters. Roman magistrates were the elected officials in Rome. Each magistrate was a sequential step of public offices called the *cursus honorum* (course of honors). Here is the list of offices in ascending order: 1) military tribune, 2) quaestor, 3) aediles, 4) praetor, and 5) consul. Of note, being elected Quaestor is an automatic membership to the Senate. For a Roman to be eligible for the Senate, he must be at least 30 years old and own property. Furthermore, he is forbidden to participate in business transactions. See Roberts, 85-89.

²³ *Empires of Trust* proposes that Rome gained its empire reluctantly, forced to rule for the good of mankind; essentially, an antiquity version of 'Manifest Destiny'. For more information, see Thomas Madden, *Empires of Trust*, (New York: Penguin Group/Dutton, 2008), 1-20.

²⁴ Freeman, 104-105. Roman proconsuls (governors) routinely committed acts of graft and embezzlement in their provinces. It was a Roman custom and widely accepted. However, Caesar during his consulship passed legislation that curtailed this practice.

²⁵ Roberts, 160-161. Roman roads linked the Republic with its territories. It facilitated the movement of troops, goods, and services throughout the Middle Sea and beyond. The majority of the roads were built by legions in conjunction with slave labor.

²⁶ The early-republic army consisted of landowning militia who were citizen-farmers when not on campaign. In times of war, a draft of landowning citizens filled the ranks of the legions. Once over, the army was disbanded. This practice was inefficient because of the loss of experience when the army disbanded. Also, war placed economic hardship on Rome because of the farmers, merchants, and craftsmen were on campaign instead of working on their trade. Gaius Marius, a famous Roman general of common descent, instituted a policy of recruiting Rome's lowest-born citizens to fill the depleted ranks of the army. For more information, see Adrian Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, (London: Orion Books, 2000. Phoenix, 2007), 106.

²⁷ Gilliver, 20.

²⁸ Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 69-73. Of note, a cohort's senior centurion served as cohort commander; this task organization was Caesar's preferred method.

²⁹ Ibid., 49. Military tribunes were often young Roman nobleman elected by the People Assembly to serve as Officers in the Roman Army. It was the first step in the *cursus honorum* (course of honors) which denoted that a candidate for the Senate had to serve in the army. Due to their young age and minimum skill levels, military tribunes were primarily staff officers or aide-de-camps to legates. However, some officers from the Equestrian class remained in the army for years and gained assignment as cohort commanders.

³⁰ T. Rice Holmes, *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*, (London, New York: The Macmillan Company; 1903), 23.

³¹ Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 169.

³² Stephen G. Brady, *Caesar's Gallic Campaign*, (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1963), 4-10.

³³ See Note 33.

³⁴ William Blakely Tyrell, "Biography of Titus Labienus, Caesar's Lieutenant in Gaul", (PhD diss: University of Washington, 1970), 18-27. Titus Labienus was Caesar's second-in-command. He was a skilled general and fighter, playing a major part in Caesar's Gallic victories. However, during the Roman Civil War, Labienus sided against Caesar because he felt that he did not get the respect and credit he deserved.

³⁵ Gilliver, 33.

³⁶ Stephen Dando-Collins, *Caesars's Legion*, (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 20-23. The information about Caesar and Ariovistus was taken from Caesar, 37.

³⁷ Meir, *Caesar: A Biography*, 246-247.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 248-250.

³⁹ Gilliver, 40-41. After the Veneti incident, there was a brief lull in the fighting. Events, however, were still precarious. Caesar distributed his legions in various over-watch positions all over northern and eastern Gaul. In particular, he ordered Publius Crassus to the Spanish border with one legion and its *auxilia*. The triumvirate's son, Crassus, was pitted against the tough Aquitani tribes. Along with their Spanish allies, the Vocattes and Tarusates aimed to sever Roman supply lines. Once cut off, the tribes anticipated that Rome would quit for home—a horrid assumption. Crassus, clever and intelligent, avoided enemy hit-and-run attacks by keeping his baggage train close. Then, he boldly attacked Aquitani base camps, destroying their supplies in the process. Approximately, 50,000 Gauls were slaughtered in Crassus' surprise attack, which effectively ended resistance in southwest Gaul. For more information see Gelzer, 126.

⁴⁰ Holmes, 70-75.

⁴¹ Brady, 67-70.

⁴² Penrose, 127. As Caesar was occupied with Briton, activity increased in Gaul. Quintus Titurius Sabinus, further east near the Rhine, was besieged by a Belgian tribe, the Eburones. Clearly outnumbered with dwindling supplies, the Roman fort was in a tenuous position. The Eburones promised to let the Romans withdraw unmolested, if they left their fort behind. Sabinus, naively, agreed to the truce—when clear of the fort, the Eburones killed Sabinus along with many legionnaires. The *Imperator* was enraged: Sabinus because of his foolishness and the Gauls for their treachery. This attack was the greatest Roman defeat in all of Gaul. For better information on Caesar's British Campaign, see Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 269-292.

⁴³ Gilliver, 50-51.

⁴⁴ Brady, 90-92.

⁴⁵ Gelzer, 145.

⁴⁶ Gilliver, 51-52.

⁴⁷ Brady, 110-117. Gilliver, 52.

⁴⁸ Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 223.

⁴⁹ Caesar, 152-157.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Meir, 321.

⁵¹ Holland, 270.

⁵² Meir, 320-327.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Sun Tzu and Clausewitz were military theorists that expounded on the nature and character of war.

⁵⁵ Caesar, 10-13. Gilliver, 14-15.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Freeman, 209.

⁵⁸ Caesar, 43-45.

⁵⁹ Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 21-25.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Freeman, 157-158.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 159.

⁶³ Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 315-316.

⁶⁴ Gelzer, 141.

⁶⁵ Meir 257.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 258.

⁶⁷ Gilliver, 82. Additionally, the Gauls levied extensive taxes on Roman trade routes that crossed the Alps. During his 58 BC and 57 BC operations, Caesar 'nationalized' these routes, gaining control over wares that flowed in and out of Gaul. If a tribe wanted to trade with Rome, then they would abide by Caesar's rules. For more information on trade routes, see Goldsworthy, *Caesar: Life of a Colossus*, 317.

⁶⁸ Meir, 307.

⁶⁹ To illustrate, the Bellovaci marched on Caesar prior to his battle with the Nervii, only to become shaken and retreat. Caesar, along with the Aedui, moved with great speed, catching the luckless tribe at their *oppidum*.

Throughout central Gaul, the Aedui assisted the Romans in battling the Belgae. The Bellovaci asked for mercy, which Caesar granted by placing them under the protection of the Aedui. Essentially, he rewarded the Celtic tribe for their loyal support at the expense of the Bellovaci, who lost their land and autonomy. For more information, see Caesar, 49.

⁷⁰ Gelzer, 112.

⁷¹ Roberts, 100.

⁷² Freeman, 207-208. Caesar went on a terror campaign in northeast Gaul after the defeat of Cotta and Sabinus. He ravaged the countryside burning villages and enslaving the tribesmen. Another outcome of Caesar's systematic destruction of property was the increase of instability in Gallic tribes. Despite Roman presence, Gallic chieftains remained internally focused on their own tribes and surrounding neighbors. The loss of property and wealth undermined a chieftain's position. In fact, it became extremely difficult to govern, if there was nothing left to govern. As a result, embattled Gallic leaders directed their attention and resources towards preventing an internal revolt instead of the marauding Romans. This predicament suited Caesar because tribes sought a treaty with Rome in order to maintain their standing. More information see, Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 315-316.

⁷³ For example, in the Helvetii migration the tribe brought all their effects, which made them languid. They were unable to outmaneuver the Romans, who repeatedly attacked their vulnerable baggage trains with their women and children. The Helvetii and their allies subsequently were defeated. Although Caesar released them, he destroyed or confiscated their belongings. The loss of property weakened the Helvetii beyond repair. They, unlike other defeated tribes, were no longer a threat to the Romans. See Caesar, 28.

⁷⁴ Definition of strategy from Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, MCDP 1, (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps), 28.

⁷⁵ Definition of tactics, from Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Strategy*, MCDP 1-1, (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), 1-29. For information on Caesar's decision to conquer Gaul, see Meir, 257.

⁷⁶ Divide and Conquer strategy adapted from Robert Greene, *The 33 Strategies of War*, (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 213-227.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Definition of tactics from Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Tactics*, MCDP 1-3, (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), 3.

⁷⁹ Gilliver, 67.

⁸⁰ Goldsworthy, *Roman Warfare*, 55-60.

⁸¹ Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, 186.

⁸² Adapted from Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Distributed Operations Concept*, (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2005), 1-8.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Freeman, 209-210.

⁸⁵ Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 356.

⁸⁶ Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire*, (New York: Random House, 2003), 621-42.

⁸⁷ Caesar initially installed Gallic kings over the tribes. The Gauls were angered; thus, they terminated the usurpers. Caesar, quickly, recovered from his mistake, placing credible and acceptable chieftains in power. For more information, see Goldsworthy, *Caesar: A Life of a Colossus*, 316.


⁸⁸ Plutarch, 269.

⁸⁹ Lord Kitchener was the British general credited with winning the Second Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa. The war was a mixture of conventional and brutal guerrilla-style tactics.

Appendix A

Roman Army:

The basic tactical unit of the army was a century that was commanded by a centurion; it was comprised of 100 men. A cohort contained six centuries; an experienced military tribune or centurion was in command. Cohorts were the lowest maneuver element capable of limited independent combat operations; in part, this was due to the lack of dedicated logistical support. The 6,000 man-strong legions, Rome's largest maneuver element, consisted of ten cohorts with a *legati* or legate in command. As the political and military situation dictated, various legions were combined to form an army, under the control of an *imperator* (general). During a battle, legion placement was orientated on the center, while the *alae* (wing) contained the cavalry and foreigners on the flanks.¹



(Roman Legion Formation, <http://users.chariot.net.au>)

Appendix A

Roman Weapons:

A legionnaire's offensive weaponry was straight forward: *gladius* (sword), *pila* (spear), *scutum* (shield), *pugio* (knife). Unlike his Gallic counterpart, a Roman soldier was provided standardized weapons of the highest quality from the Republic. Roman hand-to-hand weapons called for close quarter combat, while missile weapons provided the necessary stand-off capability. Once formed for battle, the legions slowly advanced under a strict code of silence; they maintained an orderly formation and stopped within throwing distance of the *pilum*. Then, a massive volley of *pilas* and arrows, along with stones from catapults, was released to disrupt enemy formations. As the belligerents finally clashed, organized shoulder-length apart and three rows deep, the legionnaires fell upon their disorganized enemy. *Alae* protected the Roman flanks, as the cavalry battled—and, as needed—pursued those retreating from the battlefield. This example is one method of Roman battle; i.e., “open battle”. Similarly, Caesar's legions were just as adept in other forms combat including siege and guerilla warfare.²

¹ Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army*, (New York: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2003), 46-48.

² *Ibid.*, 174-189.

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